discuss the disputes between the Allies in the case of Poland, Greece and Yugoslavia, in an attempt to convince the public of the validity of the Ustasha nation-building policies. (Sinov i , 1998, pp 21-25) This argument grew in significance just prior to and after the Yalta conference.
In early 1945, the Yalta conference was the central foreign affairs topic in the NDH press. Of all the dailies in the NDH, Hrvatski narod dedicated the greatest number of articles to the announcement of the conference between the "Big Three" and the commentaries on the decisions from Yalta -as many as 19 articles in 37 issues (1241 to 1278), printed from 23 January to 7 March 1945. The announcement of the conference was positioned either on page 6 or on the back cover (page 8, 10 or 12), while the analyses of the Yalta negotiations were published on the front page.
Sarajevo's Novi list published the first announcement of the possible conference in Yalta as early as 8 January, in issue No. 1120, on page 2, under the title Trojni sastanak radi rješenja pitanja, koja se ne mogu riješiti. However, by 24 February -when Yalta was mentioned for the last time -eleven articles were published, usually on page 2 or 3.
Of all the weeklies, Spremnost dedicated the largest amount of space to analyzing the conclusions from Yalta and their repercussions on the NDH. This is confirmed by six articles, mostly taken from the neutral press, which were published in the column Odjeci iz svijeta, from No. 156 of 11 February to No. 165 of 15 April; and editorials by Milivoj Magdi entitled Nakon Krima (4 March 1945), Spremnost No. 159, p 1, and Vjera u Hrvatsku (15 April 1945) , Spremnost No. 165, p 1.
The Investigative Bureau of the NDH's Ministry of Foreign Affairs dictated the contents of the NDH press. In the weekly overviews from European press (mostly neutral and German) by the Investigative Bureau, materials were prepared for print, which reported on Stalin's wise policies, his postponing of the conference until the opportune moment struck on the East Front, and the increasingly favorable situation for the Soviets in the negotiations with the Polish government in exile. They stressed the negotiations focused on the location and the date of the second conference of the Big Three, which were, it was interpreted, dominated by the Soviets. This was the setting in which the NDH press was given the task to comment on the preparations for the conference of the Big Three in Crimea. (15 January 1945), Swiss press overview, HDA, the MVP Fonds -Investigative Bureau, Box 28, No. 823.
Following the guidelines of the MVP, Hrvatski list and Sarajevo's Novi list revealed why the Soviet offensive had begun simultaneously with heavy combat in the West, which had obviously weakened American and British forces. It had primarily been motivated, they explained, by Stalin's desire for the Soviets to be the sole victors in the war on European ground, thus enabling them to uncompromisingly impose the conditions of peace. This was the reason for Stalin to purposefully postpone the meeting with Churchill and Roosevelt, biding his time in order to gain on the battle field a better negotiating position, concluded Sarajevski novi list and Hrvatski list. It is a fact that Stalin had no need of a political meeting in regard to Eastern Europe, since he was already in the process of accomplishing his goals on the battlefield. A stronger interest for the meeting was shown both by Roosevelt and Churchill. The former expected the Soviets to engage in warfare in the Pacific. (Although he had been informed in August 1944 of the construction of powerful nuclear weapons, and knew they might be ready for use by August 1945, it was uncertain whether this could result in the collapse of Japan.) The latter felt there was a danger in Bolshevism spreading across greater part of Europe, and insisted Germany was divided and France included as a major continental gate. (Reynolds, 2007 , pp 100, 103, 110, 114, 115, 122 and 148. Murray-Millett, 2001 , p 477. Rothberg, 1966 Articles similar to these appeared in the NDH press without an answer as to what consequences the NDH might suffer if such scenarios were realized. The NDH press covered the Soviet military success and the glum future of Europe as if it did not include the end of Ustasha regime and the NDH. The shift in register would not occur before the very end of the war, in the final days of May 1945. In lieu with the Ustasha government Memorandum, the Zagreb newspapers, which were the only ones still in print in the NDH, openly advocated the values of Western democracies and sought the help of the USA and Britain against the JA.
The first news covering the negotiations of Allies on the Black Sea already appeared in early February in Sarajevski novi list (SNL): The lengthy Black Sea conference -Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin hide their grand designs for the sack of Europe. Special attention was given to news from Stockholm, which alleged that Roosevelt revealed the plan to sack Germany and its industries, and take charge of their air force. (10 February 1945) SNL No. 1149, p 8. To gain plausibility, such news was generally taken from the neutral Swedish and Swiss press by the Investigative Bureau of the MVP. For example, in the weekly overview of the foreign press from early February, it was reported that the Allies would insist on the alteration of German borders, in order to defray the Soviets in the East and accomplish the desired Curzon Line. The compensation was to take place in the West, while Germany would waive East Prussia. (8 February 1945) Granice budu e Njema ke, Swiss press overview, HDA, the MVP Fonds -Investigative Bureau. Box 28, No. 844. For further details, see Rothberg, 1966, pp 86-97. Soon thereafter, all newspapers in the NDH would cover the decisions of the Allies detrimental to Germany, as well as the trade with European territories, despite the fact that the Western Allies advocated the principles from the Atlantic Charter and the right of nations to self-determination, it was explained. The NDH press presented it as proof that Britain and the USA were abandoning the implementation of principles from the Atlantic Charter on the dictates of Stalin. Hrvatski narod, the leading political daily in the NDH, presented Croatian readership with attitudes from the German newspapers -Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, Völkischer Beobachter and Zwölf Uhr Blatt -on the possible conclusions of the meetings. The dejected tone of German articles testified to a difficult military and political situation, and implied the imminent end of war. German victory was never mentioned, but speculations abounded on war damages, waiving parts of East Germany to the Lublin Committee, and the Allied protectorate over Germany. The meeting in Yalta was presented as a high-scale fraud, and the Allied principles were likened to Wilson's Points, which had doomed the Weimar Republic. In mid-February, in order to prove the great danger posed by the Soviets, not only for Eastern and Southeastern but Central Europe as well, HDU (Croatian News Office) Croatia included in their Working materials for the production of articles a German report which would serve as a model interpretation of the Soviet imperial politics in the NDH press. The Soviets had, the report said, put their dominant military and political position to excellent use in realizing their imperial plans. The Soviet Union, it was said, was the leading world force, which was confirmed both by the place of the Allied conference, and by the complete autocracy with which the Soviets promoted their political and territorial advances. By the wise use of politics, it was concluded, Stalin had completed all the preliminaries to form an all-Slavic union under the Russian flag, which had already been joined by Bulgaria, Macedonia, Albania and Yugoslavia. Pending was the finalization of a pro-Soviet Central-European union which was supposed to include Hungary, Austria, Czechoslovakia and Poland. (Tri velika saveza država pod sovjetskom zaštitom. Working materials for the production of articles, HDA, Fonds of HDU Croatia, Box No. 94) This was another piece of evidence aimed at convincing the NDH public that Croatian people were threatened by a recently forming association under the wing of the USSR. On the Pan-Slavic Committee and Soviet influence on Slavic nations in Europe see ilas, 1990, p 376.
More detailed information on the results of the Allied negotiation in Crimea was presented to the readership by the publication of Roosevelt's report to the Senate and the Congress in Sarajevo's Novi list on 3 March 1945. The conference had had, it was mentioned therein, two purposes; namely, to ensure the political and strategic prerequisites for the present collapse of Germany, with the least losses incurred, and to secure lasting peace through international contracts. Accordingly, the decisions at the conference were as follows: unconditional surrender of Germany, without the purpose of annihilating the German people; temporary post-war supervision of Germany by Britain, the Soviet Union, France and the USA; and German obligation of war reparations. It was telling that Sarajevo's Novi list and Hrvatski narod published the conclusions from Yalta without a tinge of propaganda. One of the reasons was that the decisions of Allies pertaining to Germany were partially applicable to the NDH as well. This aimed at producing fear in the Croatian public and painting the picture of what the vanquished may expect at the end of the war. It almost seemed like an attempt to mobilize the citizens in the defense of a lost cause, a state with no future once the war ended. The attitude of the Ustasha upper echelons towards the Yalta decisions was brought to Croatian citizens by Ivo Bogdan in his editorial of 14 February 1945 in Hrvatski narod. It was a harsh criticism of the allegedly perfidious Allied policy of trading with the territories of European nations -Poles, Germans and Croatsin order to meet the interests of victors. The decision to fuse the government-in-exile of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia with Tito's communist government received some of the worst negativity. Bogdan wondered about the missing principles of the Atlantic Charter and the right of nations to self-determination, as well as the aid given to the small nations by the Allies, alluding at the dubious survival of the Croatian state after the war. Following the usual pattern, a more subtle approach to the Crimean decisions was offered by Spremnost. Its columnist Milivoj Magdi wrote a positive review of Winston Churchill's speech before the House of Commons and Roosevelt's New Year message. Special attention was given to their care for the active implementation of principles from the Atlantic Charter, or the realization of the rights of every nation to self-determination. Nevertheless, Magdi concluded that Yalta had not resulted in the desired improvements, other than the confirmation of general guidelines, which put the smaller nations of Europe into risk. He lauded Churchill's statement that England would, once the war ended, seek solutions for free and unhindered democratic elections, but he reminded his readership of the problem with the state of Poland and unfulfilled obligations by the British. The problem, Magdi said, was that the British ideas of freedom and democracy differed considerably from the Soviet ones. He therefore repeated a rhetorical question put to Churchill by a British journalist: The author brought up the Polish question in his article, while actually thinking of the NDH and its post-war status. It would be determined by the superiority of arms, instead of the idealist principles of the Atlantic Charter, as if the value system of Western democracies was applicable to a German war-time puppet state, the Ustasha Croatia. Magdi considered Churchill's and Roosevelt's opinions on freedom, democracy and the right to self-determination fine and commendable, which was a significant move away from the previous Ustasha rhetoric. He was, however, aware that the conquered would not have the right to choose; in Southeastern Europe the Soviets would have the last say along with Tito's partisans, or, as he called them, the Bolshevik branch. Therefore, since Germany could not win, he rooted for the victory of the Western Allies. (15 April 1945) Vjera u Hrvatsku, Spremnost No. 165, p 1.
The entire report reeks with the truth of Roosevelt, Stalin and Churchill not being able to give any promises to the
Spremnost, which had written about the Western democracies in a more benevolent style since Tehran, quite openly advocated the strife between the Soviets and the Western Allies, although the scenario was unrealistic. It was a propaganda strategy devised by the Ustasha government and influenced by Germans at the end of war. Such propaganda was specifically directed against the Soviets, with the desire to end the Alliance between the USSR and the Western Allies. Nevertheless, it would be rather pretentious to believe that articles from the Spremnost might have had any influence on the international political relations -they were not able to significantly influence even the political and war events in the NDH. It would be closer to truth that they reflected the fear with which the Ustasha elite faced the destiny that awaited them after the victory of the Allied forces, or the NOP led by Tito's communists. Reflecting on the former power and significance of Britain in Europe, articles in Spremnost actually invited the Western Allies to act and not to allow the Bolshevization of Eastern and Southeastern Europe; meaning that, if somebody had to establish their authority in the NDH, it should be the Western Allies.
It is paradoxical for Magdi to refer to the principles of the Atlantic Charter as if the German project of Neue Europa was founded on the values of Western democracies. Poland and the Ustasha Croatia had nothing in common, and the post-war destiny of Poland was largely determined by the German occupation and their secret agreement with Stalin from 1939. The NDH was a product of war, the product of German and Italian volition, and the Ustasha regime was the signee of the Tripartite Pact and belonged to the Axis forces. (Jeli -Buti , 1977 , pp 61 and 85) The value system which the Ustasha government constructed from 1941 to 1945, modeled on the Nazi Germany, was incompatible with the program of the Atlantic Charter or the UN Charter. The assumption that Germans respected the rights of the smaller nations was invalid. The Nazi Germany occupied the greater part of Europe by the use of military force, abolishing some states and creating new ones. In the occupied states, it set up either its own government or the pro-Nazi regime, as was the case in the NDH, Slovakia and Norway. Apart from Poland, Eastern and Southeastern Europe did not hold much significance in the Allied negotiations. Issues discussed by the Allies generally focused on their military alliance and the collapse of Germany and Japan, along with war reparations and the division of Germany as the war drew to its end. Both Roosevelt and Churchill were aware they would have little influence on the post-war formation of governments in the territories Assembly of the League of Nations. The Soviets, it was continued, were using their victory on the battlefield in a political sense, to form the governments in Hungary, Poland, Finland and Bulgaria by force. The right to veto also enabled the Soviets to partake in military activities along the USSR border, without any fear of an intervention by the international organization for peace and security. For these reasons the San Francisco meeting was doomed to failure, Hrvatski narod concluded. (4 April 1945) HN No. 1300, p 1.
Finding fault in advance with the outcome of the San Francisco meeting, Hrvatski narod published news from Swedish papers Svenska Dangbladet to promote its negative forecast. Accordingly, the greatest problem before the sessions even started was the number of votes given to each of the great forces, and whether the USSR had the right to a larger number of votes than Britain and its dominions. Stressing the problem of Poland, on the basis of commentaries from the Portuguese Voz and the English Daily Mail, special attention was given to the fact that the Allies had agreed to the Soviet request to exclude the Polish government in exile from activities in the League of Nations, and that Stalin had openly asked for Poland to be represented at the international conference by the Lublin Committee. 
Conclusion
During the final months of the war, the NDH press gave its best to prove there was strife between the Allies and that the joint warfare of the USA, Great Britain and the USSR was absurd. It was an important propaganda task for the Ustasha regime. There was an attempt to create an impression in public that the Allied Forces were dissolving, due to which there was a need to mobilize human and material resources in the strife against communism. In the Ustasha ranks it was believed that such a development would aid their foreign policies, opening the possibility of negotiations with the Western Allies. These beliefs constituted a significant argument for the post-war fate of the NDH. The hope, expectedly, turned out to be unreasonable since Germany and its satellites had already lost the war. An imaginary separate peace was a utopia for the NDH, since the Allies had previously agreed in Moscow that the Ustashas would appear before the courts of law of the DFJ, the already restored state of Yugoslavia.
During February, March and April 1945, the dailies Hrvatski narod, Sarajevo's Novi list and Hrvatski list would dedicate a large number of articles to disputes in the Allied ranks. As a rule, Hrvatski narod used to publish articles covering such issues on the front or back cover (the latter being page 6 or 4). In the final four months, in exactly one hundred issues -from issue No. 1225 on 3 January 1945 to issue No. 1325 on 5 May 1945 -there were 44 articles published. This means that the editors of Hrvatski narod dedicated a significant amount of space to the Allies and their conflicts nearly every other day. Hrvatski list was in circulation until mid-April 1945 -from issue No. 1 on 3 January to issue No. 73 on 7 April -and published 24 articles on the subject, usually on the cover or page 2. Sarajevo's Novi list published 17 articles, mostly on pages two or three, from issue No. 1119 on 6 January to issue No. 1188 on 28 March. These articles predicted the imminent dissolution of the Allied Forces, World War III and the apocalyptic future of the world.
The Ustasha propaganda could not offer a viable solution for the NDH, but spitefully lamented the disputes among
